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Abstract
The official stateform of Hungary between 1920 and 1944 was „monarchy”. Since she did not have a king for a long time, however, it is 
often interpreted, even in academic analyses, in a way that it was, in fact, a kingdom with an unspecified monarch, viz without a king that could 
have been determined. At the level of stateforms, this ambivalent situation of a „kingless kingdom” is expressed by the category „monarchy without 
a king”. Some legal scholars consider this category to be one of the particular variants of monarchy, while others argue that it might be conceived at 
a certain point on the scale between the two main types of stateforms, namely between monarchy and republic. This paper analyzes the origin of the 
term „monarchy without a king”, its meaning in public law and its interpretation within the framework of Hungarian legal history. In the latter 
respect, it raises the questions whether the term can be used to define and characterize the Hungarian stateform in the Horthy era, and if so, what 
specific meaning it conveys.
Keywords: Stateform; constitutional history of Hungary; claim of Charles I of Austria (Karl I from the Dynasty Habsburg -Lothringen as 
emperor of Austria; Karl III as king of Bohemia; and Karl IV as king of Hungary) to the Hungarian throne; legal regulation of powers and com-
petencies of the regent of Hungary between 1920 and 1944; the political meaning of stateform.
The term „monarchy without a king” is a denomination of 
a special stateform .1 As it suggests something incompatible with 
the nature of monarchy, some scholars consider it to be a prob-
lematic category . Thus, the stateform and form of government 
of Hungary between 1920 and 1944 are called „regency” in the 
English literature,2 even at the price that the actual Hungarian 
situation did not correspond to the traditional concept of re-
gency . It can be argued that a monarchy without a king is neither 
a real monarchy nor a (real) republic . Therefore, some do not 
employ this term arguing that it is semantically incorrect and 
even misleading . Others only use it between quotation marks in 
order to emphasize its unreal, fictional or even illusionary char-
acter . Those who employ the term face difficulties in establish-
ing its precise meaning for a specific state . Furthermore, many 
argue that it has a pejorative and malicious connotation, which 
indicates some criticism already at the terminological level . The 
criticism lays in the assertion that the term „monarchy without 
a king” cannot be used to define stateform . I discuss this view 
below .
1. General Meaning and Origin of the Term 
„Monarchy without a King”
As for stateform, the term „monarchy without a king” carries 
in itself the sole implication that the throne remains unfilled in 
a particular state in the longer term . This, namely the unfilled 
nature of the throne refers to some sort of anomaly in the case 
of monarchy as a stateform suggesting continuity and perpetu-
ity (cf . Le roi est mort, vive le roi) . An unfilled throne in a monar-
chy is an exceptional situation which – in case the person to fill 
the throne is known but cannot exercise his/her power – can be 
remedied by public law in various ways .
In the Middle Ages and in the Late Middle Ages such rem-
edies included regency with a regent, or in some cases with a re-
gency council. Regency as an institution allowed someone else to 
* Péter Takács, Professor of Jurisprudence and Theory of State, Széchenyi István University, Győr, Hungary .
1 Throughout this paper, the terms „stateform” and „form of state” (Germ .: Staatsform, Czech: forma státu) are used to designate the public law structures 
that reflect and reinforce the most significant elements of political relations . In this general sense, these forms – although they have several classifica-
tions and typologies – have usually been categorized into two main classes („monarchy” and „republic”) since the 16th century . In the English literature 
this general meaning is sometimes also referred to as „form of government” (Germ .: Regierungsform, Czech: forma vlády) .
2 This usage was established in the 1930 s (see Rutter, Owen, Regent of Hungary. The Authorized Life of Admiral Nicholas Horthy. London: Rich and Cowan, 
1939) and is still common today . For the latter see, e .g ., Romsics, Ignác: Changing Image of Miklós Horthy, in: Vít, Michal – Baran, Magdalena M . 
(eds .), Transregional versus National Perspectives on Contemporary Central European History. Studies on the Building of Nation -States and Their Cooperation in the 
20th and 21st Century. Stuttgart: Ibidem Press, 2017 . pp . 253–268 . Different authors draw attention to the contradiction differently . Helmut David 
Baer, for example, puts it in this way: „Thus Horthy was regent for the king – only Hungary had no king… Hungary in the Horthy period was tech-
nically a monarchy . It was a monarchy without a king, governed by a temporary regent whose position was permanent .” See Baer, Helmut David, The 
Struggle of Hungarian Lutherans under Communism (Texas: A & M University Press, 2006) ch . 1 . 10 .
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exercise the power of the ruler in the case of his/her minority, 
illness or longer absence .3 The regent was, in fact, the „proxy” 
or „deputy” but not the „substitute” or „vice” of the ruler . In 
the Hungarian official usage during the Middle Ages, the re-
gent was denominated by the word gubernator of Latin origin (cf . 
governor, Hung .: kormányzó) which was used to emphasize his 
strong military and political -administrative role . A well -known 
gubernator was, for example, János Hunyadi (1446-1453; dur-
ing the minority of Ladislaus V; as King of Bohemia: Ladislaus 
I Posthumous, or Ladislav Pohrobek), and Mihály Szilágyi (in 
1458, during the time between the death of Ladislaus and the 
crowning of Matthias I) .
Occasionally, the ruler had to be substituted and represented 
for different reasons: the procurator, or in some cases locum -tenens, 
represented the ruler only in a specific area – owing to its ter-
ritorial size or distance from the centre . This office had several 
equivalents and variants: in the case of old Franks, it correspond-
ed for instance with marquis (or margrave, in German: Markgraf) . 
In Hungary between 1000 and 1848 well -known variants in-
cluded palatine, a deputy and substitute of the king; however, this 
office was left unfilled in tragic circumstances in 1848 (when it 
was intended to be made part of the constitutional monarchy) . 
Since this office and institution was incompatible with the gov-
ernment accountable to the parliament, it ceased to legally exist 
after 1867 . In specific cases, more modern, non -medieval politi-
cal communities elect or „create” governors (in some cases: protec-
tors or vicegerents) in order for the state to have at least a kind of 
emergency president . Thus, the office of the governor is some-
times argued to have the feature of emergency state presidency .4 
Finally, in the practice of Hungarian public law, homo regius (the 
„man of the king”) was some sort of trustee and representative 
(in modern usage: proxy) of the king which can be regarded as 
a special 20th -century mixture of the governor (gubernator) and 
procurator . The homo regius was a confidential person of the king 
entrusted with resolving complicated issues .5
The term „monarchy without a king” is used when the throne 
is left vacant in the longer period because it is unknown – viz, 
undecided – who should or could fill it . It is not exceptional but 
irregular, not unusual but abnormal, and not paradoxical but 
contradictory if this situation lasts too long .
The term of „monarchy” or „kingdom” „without a king” was 
first used for describing the contradictory nature of a certain 
political situation, and not as a stateform yet, by an Austrian 
historian, Adolf Beer . In his book on the first partition of Poland 
Adolf Beer, who was otherwise the representative of Moravian 
towns in the Imperial Council (Reichsrat, Říšská rada) in Vienna 
between 1873 and 1897, employed this term to describe „the 
orphaned political situation” . According to him, this situation 
is like „a motherland without a mother, a kingdom without a king, 
a senate without a leader, a sceptre without a hand, a subject 
without a lord, a republic without a soul” .6 Beer’s words recall 
an old French saying, according to which „a monarchy without 
a king is like imagining a hand without fingers, a singer with-
out voice, a country without laws, or a life without joy” .7 The 
term has been employed relatively often in the recent academic 
literature; however, not as a stateform but due to its awareness-
-raising nature . For instance, a German historian, Maria Rhode 
used the term to describe seven actual but short interregnums in 
Poland,8 while an English historian, Robert Beddard employed 
the term in the title of his collection of the 1688 interim govern-
ment’s documents and minutes .9
It was first used as a denomination of stateform in the case 
of Hungary to describe the post-1921 situation in an anecdot-
al or even ironic way . According to the alleged anecdote, the 
Hungarian state is a „monarchy without a king governed by an 
admiral without a fleet in a country without a coast .” 10 Aside 
  3 One of the best -known regent in history was Marie de’ Medici who held this office three times: first, when her husband, Henry II, temporarily left the 
kingdom for the campaign of Metz (1552); second, when his second son, Charles IX, was still a minor (1560–1563); and third, when his third son, 
Henry III, went to Poland . The person of the king was known in all three cases . The case of Prince George, Prince Regent of Great Bitain during the 
incapacity of his father, George III (1811–1820), is another well -known example of regents . In Bohemia – after the emperor Frederick III as guardian 
of the young king Ladislaus entrusted him with the administration of the country –, the diet assembled in 1451 in Prague conferred the regency on 
George	of	Poděbrad,	namely	Jiři	z	Kunštátu	a	Poděbrad.
  4 To that effect was Lajos Kossuth regarded a governor who was elected „governor -president” on 14 April 1849, the day of the adoption of the Hungarian 
Declaration of Independence and the dethronement of the House of Habsburg .
  5 For example, Archduke and Field Marshal Joseph August von Habsburg -Lothringen who became „full -fledged Hungarian commissioner” (Germ .: Reichs-
verweser) of Charles I of Austria on 26 October 1918 . He appointed Mihály Károlyi to the office of Prime Minister and – after he had declared himself 
governor (Reichsverweser) of Hungary on 7 August 1919 – István Friedrich as well who had overthrown the Peidl government in a coup d’état -like event . 
A couple of days later he resigned and supported Miklós Horthy ex „imperial and royal rear -admiral” (Germ . ehem. „k. und k. Konteradmiral”) who was 
elected regent on 1 March 1920 by the Hungarian National Assembly .
  6 Cf . „das Vaterland ist ohne Vater, das Königreich ohne König, der Senat ohne Oberhaupt, das Scepter ohne Hand, die Unterthanen ohne Herrn, die Re-
publik ohne Seele” (emphasis added); see Adolf Beer, Die Erste Teilung Polens (Vienna: Carl Gerold’s Sohn, 1873), Vol . 1, p . 106 .
  7 Cf . Imagine un royaume sans roi, une main sans doigts, un chanteur sans voix, un pays sans lois, une vie sans joie c’est surement moi loin de toi.
  8 Cf . Maria Rhode, Ein Königreich ohne König. Der kleinpolnische Adel in sieben Interregna (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag – Deutsches Historisches Institut 
Warschau, Quellen und Studien 5, 1997) .
  9 Robert Beddard, A Kingdom without a King. The Journal of the Provisional Government in the Revolution of 1688 (Oxford: Phaidon, 1988) . As to the litera-
ture of the nearly same period from recent years, see Benjamin Woodford, Perceptions of a Monarchy Without a King: Reactions to Oliver Cromwell’s Power 
(Montreal: McGill–Queen’s Press, 2013) .
10 It can be found in many publications, always in an anecdotal sense . From the recents years see for example Francis Tapon, The Hidden Europe. What 
Eastern Europeans can teach us. (s .l ., Thomson Press, 2012 . p . 224) and Dawn Kazmierzak, Time to Chose. Growing up under Hitler and watching history repeat 
itself (Bloomington, Ind .: West Bow Press, 2014 .) p . 4 .
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from a French rarity 11, the throne was left unfilled for a longer 
period of time in two instances in the 20th century, mostly due 
to the movement or even will of political forces: first, in Hunga-
ry between 1920 and 1944; and second, in Spain between 1947 
and 1975 . The first became known as the Horthy era while the 
second is remembered as the Franco era . Both were associated 
with specific but similar political structures .12
According to the official view, the stateform of Hungary be-
tween 1920 and 1946 was monarchy,13 where most of the pre-
rogatives of the king were exercised by the regent (who could be 
substituted by a vice regent after 1942) . Since the throne was 
left de facto unfilled for two and a half decades, several authors 
called the public law relations at that time – sympathetically 
but slightly contradictorily – „provisorium” .14 However, this is 
a contradictory term here since monarchy is the stateform of 
continuity while provisorium implies a temporary or interim condi-
tion . Hungarian international lawyer László Buza argued in his 
public law lecture in the academic year 1939/40 that „the terms 
monarchy and provisorium are necessarily mutually exclusive . 
A monarchy can on no account be a provisional monarchy .” 15 
This contradiction is reflected in the often -raised argument that 
the real stateform of Hungary was „monarchy without a king” 
adding – as if it was a source of shame – that it is a sort of unof-
ficial category .
In the context of the Hungarian state, the term was first used 
by German literary historian Klabund, or Alfred Henschke, al-
though it is highly likely that he had borrowed it from the com-
mon talk . In the chapter on Hungary of a 1923 publication of 
the history of world literature he argued as follows: „Now even 
mentioning the name of [Endre Ady, poet of the 1918 revolu-
tion] is forbidden in Hungary . The intellectual life is paralyzed 
by strict censorship . The republic without republicans was fol-
lowed by a monarchy without a king .” 16 In 1932, a Hungar-
ian sectoral gazette drew attention to the fact that an article 
on Hungary in the American edition of National Geographic 
published a few years prior had mentioned the following two 
hungaricums: „twin city” (Budapest) and „monarchy without 
a king” (Hungary itself) .17 From 1945 on, the term became 
more widespread in Hungary and was mainly used with a criti-
cal connotation .18
Before 1945 the term „Hungarian Monarchical Republic” was 
more widespread in Hungary which, on the one hand, recalled 
the Polish Rzeczpospolita Polska and, on the other, had some sort 
of sarcastic connotation . Sándor Propper, a social democratic 
representative in the Hungarian National Assembly, argued the 
following way in his speech on 10 . January 1924: „I am seeking 
consolidation regarding constitutional law – since, at last, it has 
also gained importance – and what conclusion do I reach? We 
do not have a stateform; we are a monarchy, without a king . Re-
cently, I have read in a foreign journal that Hungary is playfully 
called »Royal Republic of Hungary« . There is no king; it is not 
allowed to create propaganda for the sake of the republic since 
one gets convicted for that…” 19
2. Some Issues and Problems about Stateform  
of Hungary
The difference, or even conflict, between de jure and de facto 
stateforms – beyond the unique and paradoxical nature of the 
11 With this term (un royaume sans roi), the French refer to the special legal status of one of their overseas territories, the Wallis and Futuna Islands . Under 
an 1887 international treaty, the French Republic recognizes the three local kingdoms existing on the territory (Uvea, Sigave és Tu’a) and that the 
traditional monarchical institutions have the power to decide in civil matters . It, however, does not recognize the kings even though the local public 
takes them into consideration . This system – in case one wished to denominate it – would in fact correspond to a „monarchy without a king” instead 
of a „republican monarchy” or „monarchical republic” .
12 Political science considers authoritarian regimes; for reasons of space, however, it cannot be discussed here .
13 At the level of legal provisions, monarchy was declared by a prime ministerial decree on 18 March 1920 and a law on 6 November 1921 (not by Law 
I of 1920) . The end of the so -called Horthy era (the coup d’état by the Arrow Cross Party on 15 October 1944 and the resignation of the regent on 16 
October 1944) did not bring about a change in stateform . It has only meant that not only the throne but also the office of the regent were left unfilled . 
After „4 April” 1945 there arose a unique public legal situation in which until 1 February 1946 the power of the head of state was officially exercised by 
the three -member High National Council established on 17 April 1945 . At the same time, Joseph Mindszenty – appointed by the Pope as Archbishop 
of Esztergom on 8 September 1945 and inaugurated on 7 October – considered himself regent of Otto Habsburg, son of Charles I .
14 See for instance Kálmán Molnár, Alkotmányos jogrendünk és a közjogi provizórium [Our Constitutional Legal Order and the Public Law Provisorium] (Pécs: 
Dunántúl Rt . Egyetemi Nyomdája, 1926) and A két világháború közötti provizórium közjogi mérlege [The Public Law Balance Sheet of the Provisorium in the Inter-
war Period] (Pécs: Karl L ., 1945); as well as Béla Túri, Mai közjogi berendezkedésünk természete [The Nature of Our Current Public Legal Framework] (Budapest: 
Stephaneum, 1928), pp . 49–63: „Az 1920:I . tc . és a közjogi provizórium [Law I of 1920 and the Public Law Provisorium”] . (In the context of Hungary, 
only authors loyal to the House of Habsburg applied the term „provisorium” for the following two eras: the Bach era (1850–1859) – in order to avoid 
calling it autocracy – as well as the temporary restoration of absolutism by Anton von Schmerling (1861–1865) – for roughly the same reasons .)
15 László Buza, Magyar közjog (Buza László előadásai alapján összeállította Beller István) [Hungarian Public Law (edited by István Beller on the basis of 
the lectures of László Buza)] (Szeged, 1939) . Manuscript . Cited in: Gábor Schweitzer, „Közjogi provizórium, jogfolytonosság, új közjogi irány . Az 
1919/1920–1944 közötti magyarországi alkotmányjog -tudomány vázlata” [Public Law Provisorium, Legal Continuity, New Public Law Orientation . 
Outline of the Constitutional Legal Science of Hungary between 1919/20–1944] . Parts 1-2, Közjogi Szemle, Vol . 7, Issue 2014/1–2 (pp . 8–16 and 9–20), 
p . 15 . On this issue, see also László Buza, A királykérdés nemzetközi jogi vonatkozásai [The International Legal Aspects of the Issue of the King] (Budapest: Pallas 
Ny ., 1928) (Offprint from Issue 1928/10 of Magyar Jogi Szemle) .
16 See Geschichte der Weltliteratur in einer Stunde (Padeborn, Salzwasser Verlag, 1923), cf . pp . 100–103 ., written by the German writer, Alfred Henschke, 
better known by his pseudonym Klabund . Moreover, the book refers to Horthy as Reichsverweser . The parts referring to Hungarian literature was pub-
lished in Hungary in 1929 in a journal, see Irodalomtörténet, Vol . 17 (1929), p . 142 . For international journalism, see István Csekey, „Das Königreich 
ohne König”, Reichspost [Vienna] (25 February 1925) .
17 Vasúti és Közlekedési Közlöny, Issue 51 (1932), p . 488 .
18 Cf . József Kardos, „A király nélküli királyság a szent korona jegyében” [Monarchy without King in the Spirit of the Holy Crown] in A magyarországi 
polgári államrendszerek [Hungarian Civil State Systems], ed . Ferenc Pölöskei and György Ránki (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1981), pp . 438–469 .
19 Nemzetgyűlési napló [Diary of the Hungarian National Assembly], Volume XIX (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1924), p . 90 .
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issue – raised difficulties in three aspects: first, because of the 
claim of Charles I to the Hungarian throne; second, because of 
the expansive legal regulation of powers and competencies of 
the regent acting in the function of the head of state; and third, 
for political reasons . In the given period, such contradictions 
were tolerable in the eyes of many as they considered the situ-
ation to be temporary . However, the situation remained „tem-
porary” for two and a half decades – the same way it happened 
later on a few more occasions in this historical landscape . The 
paradoxical nature of this issue can well be illustrated by the ar-
gument of the late legitimist lawyer, Tibor Farkas (1883–1940) 
who claimed that in the case of monarchy, institution and per-
son, by its nature, belong together . He argued that a monarchy 
without a king is as inconceivable as a „gold pengő” (a special 
currency of the time) without gold, or „national unity without 
the unity of spirits” .20
2.1 The Claim of Charles I to the Hungarian Throne  
and Related Problems
The first difficulty, namely the claim of Charles I to the 
Hungarian throne, can only be evaluated in a specific histori-
cal context which needs to be discussed in detail . The difficul-
ty in this regard was triggered by the defeat and dissolution of 
the Austro -Hungarian Empire in and in the wake of the First 
World War and the wave of revolutions that evolved simulta-
neously . Although in a proclamation on 16 October 1918 21 
Charles I claimed that he wants to transform the monarchy 
into a federal state, the political communities of stronger na-
tions such as the Czechs, Slovaks and Croats seceded from 
the monarchy in late October, and independent Austria was 
also established . In late October 1918, the so -called Aster 
Revolution broke out in Budapest .22 The homo regius (gover-
nor) substituting the king with omnipotence revoked János 
Hadik’s appointment as Prime Minister from three days prior 
and appointed Mihály Károlyi as Prime Minister who formed 
a „people’s government” with the representatives of the three 
parties of the Hungarian National Council and solemnly 
swore in as head of government on 31 October . On the same 
day a military unit, in circumstances still unclear, murdered 
former Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza, the main po-
litical opponent of Károlyi .
A revolution took place in Vienna as well where the Aus-
trian National Assembly – after Charles I had, at the persua-
sion of his confessor, renounced „all kinds of participation in 
the Austrian state affairs” in a declaration on 11 November 
1918 declaring that „[he] recognize[s] in advance the decisions 
the Austrian people make about its future stateform” 23 – pro-
claimed the Republic of Austria on 12 November 1918 . The 
day after, a Hungarian delegation paid a visit to the emperor in 
his hunting lodge in Eckartsau who made a declaration in the 
presence of the delegation as well . According to the declaration, 
„[e]ver since I took the throne, I have sought to liberate my 
peoples from the horrors of war, in the outbreak of which I had 
no share . I do not want my person to hinder the development 
of the Hungarian nation, towards which I remain to feel a deep 
affection . Therefore, I withdraw from any participation in state 
affairs and recognize in advance the decision of Hungary to 
establish her future stateform .” 24
Three days later, on 16 November 1918, the National As-
sembly decided upon a „people’s resolution” (law) which was 
proclaimed on the square in front of the Hungarian Parliament 
and published in the Hungarian corpus juris .25 It declared that 
„Hungary is independent of every other country and is an au-
tonomous people’s republic” . Four months later (on 21 March 
1919), this republic – with Mihály Károlyi appointed as interim 
president on 11 January 1919 – was transformed into a coun-
20 Zalamegyei Újság (13 March 1935) . As cited in Zoltán Paksy, „Nagypolitika kicsiben: parlamenti választás és társadalmi háttere Zalaegerszegen 1935-
ben” [High Politics in Small: Parliamentary Election and Its Social Background in Zalaegerszeg in 1935], Korall. Társadalomtörténeti folyóirat. Issue 17 
(2004), p. 93 .
21 This proclamation of 16 October 1918 – declaring that Austria would be a „federal state […] in which every people forms a separate state community 
on its territory of settlement” – called upon the different national communities to establish their own national assemblies . Accordingly, the Hungarian 
National Assembly was established on 24 October in Budapest with the chairing of Mihály Károlyi . For an evaluation of the role of high politics and the 
issue of nationality in the dissolution of the Austro -Hungarian Empire see Ferenc Fejtő, Rekviem egy hajdanvolt birodalomért. Ausztria -Magyarország szétrom-
bolása [Requiem for a Late Empire. The Disruption of Austria -Hungary] (Budapest, Atlantisz Könyvkiadó, 1990); and Oszkár Jászi, A Habsburg -Monarchia 
felbomlása [The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy]. trans .: Judit Zinner (Budapest, Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1982) .
22 In essence, this meant the following at that time: soldiers who gathered in the streets waiting to be transported (replacing their cap buttons with asters) 
prevented – along with the revolutionary masses who had been protesting for days – the launching of march companies, seized some of the strategically 
important locations of the city and freed the political prisoners . The revolution of high politics – which sought to comply with the forms of legality until 
20 March 1919 (today we would put it the follow way: it was „ruled by the rule of law”) – took place in palaces in the downtown and in the Parliament . 
At the same time, revolutions broke out in several German constituent states (in early November 1918 the republic was proclaimed in Bavaria and then 
in Berlin) .
23 As a matter of fact, the text of the Austrian declaration was the result of a carefully crafted compromise as the Austrian government had discussed the 
issue for almost a day . Since the majority of ministers did not agree with dethronement, the view was adopted that the ruler should not give up the 
throne but only his participation in state affairs .
24 Secondary sources sometimes publish the text of the declaration with different wording . The main variation in text is the presence of the phrase „I re-
sign” instead of „I withdraw” in some of the sources . (The most comical source in this regard is a Wikipedia page, cf . https://hu .wikipedia .org/wiki/
Eckartsaui _nyilatkozat, where „I withdraw” stands in the html text while the attached jpg file says „I withdraw” .) Later on, Charles I argued that the 
declaration shall be deemed invalid since he signed it under coercion .
25 It was published in Issue 16 of the Hungarian Corpus Juris (Országos Törvénytár) on 22 November 1918 . The law is not published by several contem-
porary legal collections – for instance the online database Laws of 1000 Years (Wolters Kluwer, 2015) whose material between 1918 and 1929 starts 
with the year 1920 .
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cil republic,26 mainly because of the political weakness of its 
founders (which was closely linked to international relations as 
well) . The Council Republic, however, failed after 133 days .
In autumn and winter 1919, under consolidated power rela-
tions, the first and second law of the National Assembly – which 
convened on the grounds of the January 1920 elections – laid 
the foundation for the public legal order that was unequivocally 
defined by Prime Ministerial Decree No . 2394 .
Law I of 1920 – as its title suggests, temporarily – „settled” 
„the exercise of the competence of the public authorities” and – 
according to its own interpretation – „restored” constitutional-
ism . Its Preamble declared that „the exercise of royal power” 
ceased to exist on 13 November 1918, while the „function-
ing” of the parliament summoned in 1910 was „terminated” 
on 16 November 1918 . The legislator interpreted this situa-
tion – recalling the constructive methods of cunning lawyers – 
in a way that, for these reasons, „the exercise of the compe-
tence of the public authorities became impossible under the 
ordinary arrangements of the constitution”,27 which ruled out 
the question whether it was the ordinary arrangements of the 
constitution that failed . Although in a slightly circumstantial 
way, he established that what had been hitherto bound „in 
an indivisible and inseparable way” (indivisibiliter ac insepara-
biliter), namely the Austro -Hungarian Empire, dissolved; thus, 
Hungary became independent and the elected representatives 
formed a national assembly . Later on, „the National Assembly” 
declared itself the „legitimate representation of Hungarian state 
sovereignty” which – as he put it – is entitled to arrange for „the 
additional methods of the exercise of state power” „pursuant to 
our constitution” . On these grounds, it contained a nullity pro-
vision as well . According to its Section 9, „any provision issued 
by bodies of the so -called people’s republic or Soviet republic 
by way of people’s acts, decrees or any other form of legislation 
is invalid”, therefore it needs to be deleted from the Hungarian 
corpus juris .
The most significant problem of the text was that „under our 
constitution” at that time, this law could not be regarded valid law of 
the legal system – in case we consider „our constitution” to be the 
historical constitution . This, according to any interpretation of 
the historical constitution, would have necessitated an approval 
of the upper house as well as a royal assent . As legitimist con-
stitutional lawyer Kálmán Molnár formulated a few years later, 
„according to the Doctrine of the Holy Crown, the king and 
the representatives are equally indispensable elements of the 
highest manifestations of the public authorities .” 28 Not only 
legitimists but also social -democrats emphasized the fact that 
Law I of 1920 had essentially created an unconstitutional situa-
tion . For instance, Sándor Propper based his view on this fact in 
his above -mentioned speech in 1924 when he questioned the 
legitimacy of the National Assembly .29
The Preamble of Law II of 1920 set out that the National 
Assembly had „elected” Miklós Horthy as „regent of Hungary 
on its session on 1 March 1920”, and since he had sworn in as 
regent „before the National Assembly” it inducted him into of-
fice . The so -called operative part of the law set out the following: 
„The National Assembly hereby enacts the election of Miklós 
Horthy de Nagybánya as regent of Hungary” (Section 1), then 
it determined his remuneration . In other words, this law was 
not too wordy . It remains an open question whether this regent 
was an „emergency president”, „representative of the king” or 
perhaps deputy of the king (and if so, of which king) . This law 
was also not „approved” by the ruler but signed and provided 
with a promulgating clause by the regent himself authorized by 
the National Assembly .
The text of Law I of 1920 did not deal with the nature of 
stateform; in fact, it did not even mention it . It only contained 
26 For an evaluation of the aspects of stateform of the Hungarian Council Republic, see Imre Takács, „Az államforma változásai a polgári demokratikus 
és proletárforradalom államában” [Changes in Stateform of the Civil Democratic State and the State of Proletarian Revolution], in A tanácshatalom jog-
politikája 1919-ben [The Legal Policy of Council Power in 1919], ed. Kálmán Kovács (Budapest: Magyar Jogász Szövetség . Jogtörténeti Értekezések, 1979), 
pp . 16–32 .
27 On an evaluation of the fine details emerging during the drafting of the law – for instance, the difference between the terms „its exercise is suspended”, 
„is terminated” and „is not being exercised” –, see István Szabó „Az államforma kérdése 1919/1920 fordulóján” [The Issue of Stateform at the Turn of 
1919/1920], in Ünnepi tanulmányok Máthé Gábor 65. születésnapja tiszteletére [Anniversary Studies in Honour of the 65. Birthday of Gábor Máthé] (Budapest, 
Gondolat, Bibliotheca iuridica, 2006), pp . 585–597 . See also I . Szabó, „Az alkotmányosság helyreállítása 1920-ban” [The Restoration of Constitution-
alism in 1920], Győri Tanulmányok, Issue 20 (1998), pp . 90–96 .
28 Kálmán Molnár, A szent korona -tan kifejlődése és mai jelentősége [The Evolution of the Doctrine of the Holy Crown and Its Significance Today] (Pécs, Dunántúl 
Egyetemi Nyomda, 1927), p . 10 . For an evaluation of Kálmán Molnár and the moral difficulties of university education in public law, see Gábor Sch-
weitzer: „Molnár Kálmán és a két világháború közötti alkotmányjogtudomány dilemma” [Kálmán Molnár and the Dilemmas of Consitutional Legal 
Science in the Interwar Period], MTA Law Working Papers, Issue 2015/33 .
29 See Nemzetgyűlési napló [Diary of the Hungarian National Assembly], op. cit . (1924), ibid . (Social -democrats questioned the legality of the first Na-
tional Assembly as well, arguing that the Hungarian public law at that time did not recognize such an institution and that it had no right to regard 
itself a depository of sovereignty .) On this issue, see also György Wiener, „Jogfolytonosság és megszakítottság a történeti alkotmányosság rendjében” 
[Legal Continuity and Discontinuity in the Order of Historical Constitutionalism], in A szabadságszerető embernek – Liber Amicorum István Kukorelli [To the 
Freedom -Loving Man – Liber Amicorum István Kukorelli], ed . Nóra Chronowski – Zoltán Pozsár -Szentmiklósy – Zsolt Szabó – Péter Smuk (Budapest: Gon-
dolat Kiadó, 2017), pp . 391–403, in which the author regards the law as the first significant departure from the historical constitution . A further view – 
which I myself share – emphasizes the other side and supplement of the interruption of legal continuity . According to this view, this law constituted the 
first step toward the establishment of the public law construction of a new Hungarian state – „Hungary after the Trianon Treaty” (small Hungary) –, 
namely toward the foundation of a new state . As a starting point for this issue, see Ákos Szilágyi, „A sivatag törvénye . Auschwitz és Trianon” [The Law of 
the Desert . Auschwitz and Trianon], 2000 [Kétezer]. Vol . 27, Issue 2015/1–2, pp . 3–8 .If this is a defensible view, it can be argued – in a slightly ironic 
way – that the „new state founders” attempted to re -establish the monarchy as well, even though they „did not let anyone know”, therefore they failed . 
For an evaluation of the more serious historical and international implications of this issue (with content different from that discussed here) see Iván 
Halász, Az állam összeomlása és újjáépítése [The Collapse and Reconstruction of the State] (Budapest, NKE, 2014), pp . 140–177 (esp . p . 162) .
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the quoted nullity provision and determined the rights of the 
regent (Sections 12–18) . It was Decree No . 2394/1920 . M . E . 
that declared (and partly „explained” – in an unusual way for 
a legal norm) that the stateform of Hungary is kingdom .
It should be noted that some scholar argue that Law I of 
1920 – in contrast to my above -mentioned view – took a stand 
on the issue of stateform 30 since, on the one hand, it restored 
constitutionalism „in line with the historical constitution” (and 
accordingly, Hungary was monarchy until 1918) and, on the 
other hand, both its justification (explanatory memoran-
dum aimed to persuade members of national assembly) 
and parliamentary debate referred to the stateform . Regarding 
the former aspect, my counterargument is as follows: this law 
cannot amount to the restoration of historical constitutional-
ism but to its breach as well as to the first step toward the es-
tablishment of a new constitutionalism . That is why it should have 
taken an open stand on the issue of stateform . The evaluation 
of the latter argument would raise problems of legal interpreta-
tion that I cannot discuss in detail here; however, it might only 
be required to raise the following question: what kind of a legal 
standpoint is one that is not included in the text of the law but 
is hidden in the justification? 31
The decree in question was signed on 18 March 1920 by 
Sándor Simonyi -Semadam as „Hungarian Royal Prime Min-
ister” who had been appointed by Horthy . According to the 
decree, Law I of 1920 „provide[d] for the temporary exercise 
of the duties of the head of state only in the case of an actual 
cessation of the exercise of royal power for the period until the 
manner of exercising the powers of the head of state becomes 
definitively regulated, and for this period of time the National 
Assembly transferred the exercise of rights embodied in royal 
power to the regent within the constraints set out in Section 
13 [of Law]” . The decree – following a period of nearly nine 
months of hesitation 32 – took the following unequivocal stand 
on the issue of stateform: „The legal stateform of Hungary re-
mains monarchy” .33
However, Charles I – who emphasized that the Eckartsau 
Declaration was made under coercion and is thus invalid – was 
not invited to Hungary . The entente played the biggest role in 
this which – not wanting to see a serious great power emerging 
in Central Europe – observed in approval how nations striving 
for independence are tearing the Austro -Hungarian Empire apart 
but only savoured the effects of the breakup of the centuries-
-old Habsburg power . In such circumstances, Charles I attempt-
ed to return at least to the Hungarian throne in 1921 on two 
occasions,34 and – depending on the concept – sought to occupy 
the throne of Hungary (after the Treaty of Trianon): the first 
time in Spring, with negotiations; the second time by forming 
an opposition government and leading armed groups which were 
easily defeated by a battalion consisting of a few hundred uni-
versity students in the so -called Battle of Budaörs (23 October) . 
Subsequently, the Hungarian National Assembly declared the 
termination of his rights as ruler on 6 November 1921 .35 Thus, 
Hungary became an elective monarchy at the legislative level as 
well: as the Dethronement Law set out, „the prerogative of elect-
ing a king reverted to the nation” . However, the nation was un-
able to exercise this right for two and a half decades . Admittedly, 
it did not even try to . Probably because it did not even want to .
30 See for example J . C . Swanson’s position, who stated – in my view a bit hastily – that this law „restored the kingdom”; cf . John C . Swanson, The Rem-
nants of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Shaping of Modern Austria and Hungary, 1918-1922. (s .l ., Boulder, East European Monographs, 568, 2001 .) p . 194 .
31 Interestingly, it resembles the stand taken on the state name in Article A of the Foundation of the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 which calls 
Hungary „our country” and not the state, and only indicates in its “explanatory memorandum” aimed to to persuade members of national assembly 
that „our country” stands for the Hungarian „state”, arguing that Article A, ultimately, renamed the state . See Péter Takács, A rózsa neve: Magyar Köztár-
saság. Az államok nevéről és a magyar állam átnevezéséről [The Name of the Rose: Republic of Hungary. On the Names of States and the Renaming of the Hungarian 
State] (Budapest, Gondolat, 2015), pp . 94–109 .
32 Here I mean that at the very beginning of the era governments – by way of decrees – often „tampered” with the stateform; and „smudged” the name of 
the state . On 2 August 1918, only a day after the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the government of Gyula Peidl declared the stateform prior 
to communism (People’s Republic of Hungary) which was „renamed” Republic of Hungary by the government of Stephen Friedrich on 8 August 1918 .
33 See Magyarországi Rendeletek Tára, Vol . 54 (1920), pp . 140–142 . According to the decree, state authorities, agencies and institutions shall appear as 
„authorities, agencies and institutions of the Kingdom of Hungary”, therefore, „they shall indicate the prevailing stateform of Hungary in their de-
nomination” and „thus shall be supplemented with the attributes »royal« or »Hungarian royal«” . Furthermore, it set out that „the Holy Crown as the 
symbol of Hungarian public authorities shall be applied in the coats of arms of the Hungarian state” . The act of „smudging” remained subsequently 
present in a particular area: court judgements – which were made until 1918 in the name of His Majesty, and in 1918/19 in the name of the Republic – were 
delivered after 1920 not in the name of the king but in the name of the Hungarian State . It was replaced in 1930 with the phrase in the name of the Hungarian 
Holy Crown . (In 1945 – in line with Decree No . 539/1945 . M . E . – state courts returned to the use of the phrase in the name of the Hungarian State, while 
people’s courts – in accordance with Annex 1 of Law VII of 1945 – adjudicated in the name of the Hungarian people . Law I of 1946 required the use of the 
phrase in the name of the Republic of Hungary in both cases .)
34 According to the antilegitimist argumentation, it did not have such a right since the Pragmatica Sanctio – at least, in their view – was repealed at the 
dissolution of the Austro -Hungarian Empire . (An examination of this issue in the context of state succession could provide an answer to the ques-
tion whether it happened this way; however, for reasons of space such an analysis cannot be undertaken here . See Ferenc Szávai, Az Osztrák -Magyar 
Monarchia felbomlásának következményei. Az államutódlás kérdései [The Consequences of the Dissolution of the Austro -Hungarian Empire. Issues of State Succession] 
(Pécs: Pro Pannónia, Pannónia Könyvek, 2004); with a general scope: Mónika Ganczer, Állampolgárság és államutódlás [Citizenship and State Succession] 
(Budapest – Pécs: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2013 .)
35 According to Law XLVII of 1921, „the royal prerogatives of Charles I were terminated” (Section 1), the 1723 Pragmatica Sanctio was repealed „and 
thus the prerogative of electing a king reverted to the nation” (Section 2), and the „nation upholds the ancient stateform of kingdom and postpones 
the filling of the royal throne” (Section 3) . According to legitimists, the Dethronement Law was invalid as well since, among others, it was proclaimed 
by Miklós Horthy acting as „regent of the king” . (Moreover, Law I of 1920 – in contrast with the historical constitution – contained provisions on the 
promulgation of laws without a royal assent .)
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2.2 The Legal Regulation of Powers and Competencies  
of the Regent
Another difficulty concerned the legal powers and compe-
tencies of the regent which – because of the mixed nature of the 
office – were impossible to regulate homogeneously, while the 
regulation – which otherwise appeared to be spontaneous – was 
exclusively dominated by the power considerations that aimed 
at building up an authoritarian system .
The regent – as the throne was left unfilled – did not substi-
tute for the person of the king but „represented” the royal insti-
tution (acting as someone who is head of state in his own right) . 
Employing the term used by contemporary constitutional law-
yers, he was conferred with rights of the head of state implying 
at first „soft” and then „medium” power . His legal status did 
not, in turn, resemble the legal status of presidents: his assign-
ment was not restricted to a definite period of time, and – at 
least after 1937 – he could not be held liable for any breach of 
the constitution or laws .36
Pursuant to Law I of 1920, those elements of the powers 
and competencies of the regent were characteristic that distin-
guished him from a king: he could not grant nobility (although 
he could grant „titles”, awards and ribbons), he did not have the 
right to assent laws, only the right to promulgate laws (a right 
known from the public law of the Republic), he could not act 
on the supreme patronal right of the king to grant Catholic 
ecclesiastic offices (ius supremae patronatus), he could exercise 
the right to declare war only with the consent of the National 
Assembly,37 and – on top of that – he was not entitled to the 
form of address „His Majesty” . His person was, however, in-
violable and was under the same criminal legal protection as 
the king . Later on, elements invoking the powers and compe-
tencies of a king came to the fore . After the restoration of the 
upper house (1926), he as head of state could appoint 40, later 
87, people to it for a lifelong period of time influencing the 
composition of the parliament . He had veto right in the leg-
islation, which was further extended in 1937 . Under certain 
conditions, he could postpone or dissolve the parliament, and 
his relevant restrictions were terminated in 1933 . After 1937 he 
acquired the „right to recommend a successor” while in 1942 
the office of the vice regent was created who could act as acting 
regent . The vice regent – who was elected in the person of the 
regent’s son, István (Stephen) Horthy, in 1942 – could, under 
the law – although with certain restrictions, e .g . the right to ap-
point a successor – exercise the powers and competencies of the 
regent in case the office of the regent is left unfilled .38
This might suggest that some preparations were made to fill 
the throne with a national king, where the names of Miklós 
Horthy, one of his sons or eventually his grandsons arose .39 
However, this is an unfounded conclusion . Horthy as a Calvin-
ist did not have a real chance to ascend the throne of an „Ap-
ostolic Kingdom” which – according to the public perception of 
the period – could only be filled by Catholics . (Therefore, some 
argued that the office of the governor should be denominated 
as duke) . Regarding the person of the new king, several peo-
ple at the time „came into play” or directly „made themselves 
part of the play” . One of them was Archduke Karl Albrecht of 
Austria -Teschen who – beyond his involvement in counterfeit-
ing French francs (1925), his divorce and his mésalliance second 
marriage – did not have a real chance for the Hungarian throne 
as he could not have been a national ruler – the way the major-
ity of electors wished . Another possibility was a, horrible dictu, 
Romanian -Hungarian personal union with the reign of one of 
the traditional dynasties, for instance with the members of the 
House of Savoy or an Italian prince, but these had no reality 
even if they left their marks in diplomatic correspondence or in 
any other way . A Prince of Teck was also mentioned who was, 
to a certain extent, of Hungarian blood, namely because he was 
a descendant of Rédey and had family ties to the British royal 
36 On the scope of powers of the regent, with a general scope as well, see Gábor Gyula, A kormányzói méltóság a magyar alkotmányjogban [The Dignity of the 
Regent in the Hungarian Constitutional Law] (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1932), Egyed István, „A király helyettesítése és a nádori intézmény felújítása” [Sub-
stitution of the King and the Restoration of the Office of the Palatine], Jogállam, Vol . 20, Issue 1921/8, pp . 281–291 and Barna Mezey, „Staatspräsident 
und Reichsverweser . Republik oder Monarchie? Der Weg der Staatsform in Ungarn 1919–1920“, in Das Staatsoberhaupt in der Zwischenkriegszeit, ed . 
Wilhelm Brauneder – István Szabó (Budapest: Pázmány Press, 2011), pp . 11–22 .
37 For an evaluation of the rights of the regent in respect of the military organization and within, see Roland Kelemen A katonai igazságszolgáltatás Mag-
yarországon 1867–1949 [Military Jurisdiction in Hungary 1867–1949] (Budapest: Gondolat, 2017), pp . 180–181 .
38 The extension of the scope of powers of the regent had an extensive literature at that time too . See, among others, József Bölöny, A kormányzói jogkör 
kiterjesztésének kérdéséhez [On the Issue of the Extension of the Scope of Powers of the Regent] (Budapest: Gergely, 1936) and Az 1937: XIX. t.-c. a kormányzói jogkör 
kiterjesztéséről és a kormányzóválasztásról [Law XIX of 1937 on the Extension of the Scope of Powers of the Regent and his Election] (Budapest: Gergely, 1937); Lás-
zló Buza, „A kormányzói jogkör kiterjesztése” [The Extension of the Scope of Powers of the Regent], Jogállam, Vol . 36, Issue 1937/3–4, pp . 109–115; 
András Téglássy, Utóhang a kormányzói jogkör kiterjesztésének kérdéséhez [Epilogue to the Issue of the Extension of the Scope of Powers of the Regent] (Szerencs: Farkas 
E ., 1937); István Csekey, „A kormányzói jogkör reformja” [The Reform of the Scope of Powers of the Regent], in Acta Litterarum c Scientiarum Reg. 
Universitaiis Hung. Francisco -Iosephinae [Szeged] . Sectio Jur .-Pol . Tom . X . Fasc . 5, pp . 105–161; Béla Zsedényi, „A kormányzói jogkör kiterjesztése” [The 
Extension of the Scope of Powers of the Regent], Magyar Jogi Szemle. Vol . 18, Issue 1937/3, pp . 81–101; Lajos Tihanyi, „A kormányzói jogkör kiterjesz-
tése és a királykérdés” [The Extension of the Scope of Powers of the Regent and the Issue of the King], Magyar Jogi Szemle, Vol . 18, Issue 1937/2, pp . 
3–77; László Ottlik, „A kormányzói intézmény reformja” [The Reform of Regency], Magyar Szemle, Issue 1937/3, pp . 215–230 . For an evaluation of 
the vice regent, see István Egyed, „A kormányzóhelyettes” [The Vice Regent], Magyar Szemle, Issue 1942/6 . (178), pp . 281–283 . From the more recent 
literature see István Szabó, „A kormányzó jogállása 1920–1944” [The Legal Status of the Regent 1920–1944], in Publicationes Universitatis Miskolciensis 
Sectio Juridica et Politica (Miskolc, 1996), pp . 117–172 .
39 Today it is impossible to decide whether Horthy really had dynastic plans . Nevertheless, it is highly likely that it was not his „idea to found a dynasty”, 
he only did not object it . For an evaluation of the issues pertaining to the possibilities to fill the throne, see Zoltán Speidl, Végállomás: Madeira. Kirá-
lykérdés Magyarországon (1919–1921) [Final Destination: Madeira. The Issue of the King in Hungary (1919–1921)] (Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2012) . See 
further Serédi Jusztinián, hercegprímás, feljegyzései 1941–1944 [Notes of Prince -Archbishop Jusztinián Serédi, 1941–1944], ed . Sándor Orbán and István Vida 
(Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 1990), in particular pp . 29, 91 and 115 .
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family as well; however, it is likely that these ties were backed 
by the spin doctors of the time instead of serious politicians . In 
the 1930s the possibility of a royal election was, nevertheless, 
on the agenda in some political groups, especially in the ex-
treme right,40 the authoritative political forces of the country, 
however, was not serious about it .
2.3 Political Problems
Thirdly, the situation between 1920 and 1944 brought about 
political difficulties . Partly, they related to the already complex 
political spectrum of the era which was further complicated by 
the conflict between legitimists and free electors . Those who 
would otherwise agree on most of the issues joined different 
political groups .
More importantly, the unsettled nature of the stateform did 
not enable the constitutional legal consolidation of the system, 
and – given the ideological emphasis on the interrelation of au-
thority and order, the Doctrine of the Holy Crown, as well as 
the significance of the monarchical principle – even led to dif-
ficulties of delegitimisation . For what kind of a kingdom is one 
that – while the thousands -year -old legitimisation potential of 
the monarchy is being attempted to be utilized – literally chases 
away a king! It is possible to argue that it is not simply a „mon-
archy without a king” but uprightly an „anti -monarchical” king-
dom . And what is possible to argue is surely argued somewhere 
by someone .41
There were, and still are, two characteristic views on the na-
ture of stateform between 1920 and 1944 .
According to one view, the Hungarian state „remained” mon-
archy in the given period . This view was formulated by the laws 
and suggested by state agencies and institutions . Most of the 
period’s public lawyers characterized Hungary as a kingdom, 
and it is still considered to be the majority view . In order to 
reveal the legal truth within this view, there was a need for the 
legal fiction contained in the so -called nullity law . Moreover, 
the historical -sociological treatment of this view necessitated 
the acceptance that this fictional assumption is true: „let us act 
as if nothing happened between 15 October 1918 and January 
1920!” A slightly modified version of this view would have been 
that the stateform „became” monarchy again in 1920 – and at the 
legislative level in 1921 –, provided that the dethronement law 
is undoubtedly committed to the monarchy . This latter view – 
in my opinion – could have been reasonable and sustainable for 
some time; however, I think it says a lot that – at least to my 
knowledge – this view was not held by anyone at that time .
To decide whether the stateform of Hungary „remained” or 
„became” monarchy in 1920/21 depends on one’s approach to 
the issue of legal continuity . The public law literature of the pe-
riod intensively discussed this issue, though with a distinction 
between the formal and material legal continuity – which, in my 
view, rests on false criteria . According to the former – held by 
Kálmán Molnár, among others –, the public law relations of the 
country can only be modified „by the relevant factors set out 
in the constitution”, as provided for under the constitution . Accord-
ing to the latter – majority but fragile – view (which was em-
phasized by István Egyed and Móricz Tomcsányi), the changes 
need to correspond to the spirit of the historical constitution 
while formalities are unimportant .42 Since the argument of le-
gal continuity favoured Charles I in 1920/21, the latter argu-
mentators – explicitly or implicitly – accused the former ones 
of being pro -Habsburgs . This was clearly an exaggeration since 
the former argued that on the grounds of formal legal continu-
ity one can reach any royal house, or even the republic, though 
only with the observation of formal requirements . Revolutions, 
as is known, do not show much respect for the formalities of 
law . The debate was – at that time – centred upon the validity of 
the Eckartsau Declaration . According to legitimists, it could not 
be considered the abolition of the monarchy, consent to that 
or even a valid abdication since these would have required – 
beyond the formal requisites (such as counter -signature) – the 
consent of the Hungarian Parliament . (It should be noted that 
the date of the interruption of legal continuity – in light of 
the still pending nature of the issue of discontinuity -continuity 
in 1918/19 – has gained renewed constitutional significance 
through the declaration of the Hungarian Fundamental Law; 
cf . the loss and „restoration” of state sovereignty on 19 March 
1944 and 2 May 1990, respectively .) 43
Whether the Hungarian state became or remained monarchy 
in 1920/21, it is a fact that (following the dethronement) there 
was no king in sight . Moreover, there was no real chance that 
40 About one of these attempts see Róbert Kerepeszki, „’Éljen I . Miklós, Magyarország Királya!’ Egy politikai gyűlés háttere és körülményei” [„Long Live 
Miklós I, the King of Hungary!” Background and circumstances of a political meeting], in Emlékkönyv L. Nagy Zsuzsa 80. születésnapjára [Festschrift for 
Zsuzsa L . Nagy, for her 80th Birthday], eds . Zoltán Kovács and Levente . (Püski . Debrecen: s .n ., 2010 .) pp . 135–152 .
41 Cf . Krisztián Orbán, „Száz év szorongás” [Hundred Years of Anxiety], in Hegymenet [Uphill], ed . András Jakab and László Urbán (Budapest: Osiris, 
2017), p . 78 .
42 See Schweitzer, op. cit. (2014) and Wiener, op. cit. (2017) . See further István Szabó, „A királyi trón betöltése körüli viták a két világháború közötti 
Magyarországon” [Debates around Filling the Royal Throne in Interwar Hungary], Iustum Aequum Salutare, Vol. 2, Issue 2006/1–2, pp . 171–189 .
43 See on these questions Zoltán Szente, „A historizáló alkotmányozás problémái – a történeti alkotmány és a Szentkorona az új Alaptörvényben” [The 
Problems of Historicizing Constructionism – The Historical Constitution and the Holy Crown in the New Hungarian Fundamental Law], Közjogi 
Szemle, Issue 2011/3, pp . 1–13; and Endre Orbán, „Az alaptörvény paradoxonjai – átmenetből? átmenetbe!” [Paradoxes in the Hungarian Fundamental 
Law – From Transition? To Transition!], Közjogi Szemle, Issue 2013/2, pp . 51–58 . To my knowledge, the date 19 March 1944 was first formulated by 
Joseph Mindszenty in his letter to the United States Deputy Secretary of State on 10 January 1958: „On the grounds of legal continuity, we have to 
return to this date [viz 19 . March 1944] . Only 1944 can be regarded a »normal« year .” As cited in Margit Balogh, „Mindszenty József prímás -érsek és 
az államforma kérdése 1945–1946-ban” [Archbishop Joseph Mindszenty and the Issue of Stateform in 1945–1946], Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok, 
Issue 2010/3–4, p . 119 .
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the throne – in case it still existed 44 – „would be filled without 
serious political conflicts, by wide social consensus” .45 There-
fore, this view needed to be differentiated . This differentiation 
involved the distinction between de jure and de facto stateforms 
as well as the distinction between stateforms on a „legal” and 
„political basis”, the usage of the terms „quasi -monarchy” and 
„quasi -republic”, and the odd view that the legal status of the 
governor can be deduced from that of the „unthroned king” .46 
The theoretical tampering of the issue also occurred often; for 
instance when the question of stateform was answered by the 
denomination of the form of government, or not answered at 
all .47
According to the latter view, Hungary was, in fact, a repub-
lic in the period between 1920 and 1944 . This is, and was, 
undoubtedly a radical position . No Hungarian author has ever 
taken it . However, foreign authors did not show much polite-
ness, if I could call this way the acceptance of the existing situ-
ation . The well -known Austrian public and administrative law-
yer, Adolf Merkl unequivocally stated in his analysis of the legal 
status of the head of state, in 1925 that „on the grounds of the 
legal regulation of the legal status of the head of state, Hungary 
of today must be classified as a republic” . Later, he formulated 
this view in general terms as follows: „Today [viz in 1925] Hun-
gary – irrespective of her monarchic past and perhaps monarchic 
future – is a clear cut and genuine republic .” 48 Merkl – who, as 
a pupil of Hans Kelsen, differentiated between the sociological 
and legal concepts of the state – obviously based his argument 
on the sociological understanding of state as laws since 1921 
suggested differently .
This view is supported by contemporary authors as well . Pé-
ter Kende – an analyst who can be regarded, in part, as a for-
eigner since he lived in exile for a long time – argued in 2003 
that the „realist approach” „considers Horthy to be president 
44 There was naturally a throne room at the Buda Castle (as a matter of fact, two throne rooms: one for the king and one for the queen) even though 
photographs from the 1920 s suggest that the chair looked more like a comfortable armchair of a ballroom than a canopy throne .
45 Levente Püski, A Horthy -korszak 1920–1941 [The Horthy Era 1920-1941] (Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó, 2013), p . 261 .
46 See Ferenc Faluhelyi, Magyarország közjoga [Hungarian Public Law] (Pécs: Karl Könyvesbolt, 1926), Vol . 2, p . 6 . Regarding this issue, Gábor Schweitzer 
argued as follows: among university public lawyers, „it was only Ferenc Faluhelyi who – even though in a very moderate way – expressed his support for 
the quasi -republic stateform of Hungary” claiming that the stateform of Hungary „today [in 1926] actually resembles the stateform of republics” . On the 
other hand, István Egyed „did not consider it fortunate to emphasize that the stateform of our country resembles the stateform of republic . In his view, 
the legal status of the regent can be deducted from that of the [yet] »unthroned king«”, Schweitzer, op. cit. (2014), p . 13 . See further Gábor Schweitzer: 
„A „magyar királyi köztársaságtól” a magyar köztársaságig” [From the „Royal Republic of Hungary” to the Republic of Hungary], Acta Humana. Emberi 
jogi közlemények. Vol . 5, Issue 2017/1, pp . 27–38 .
47 According to Béla Zsedényi, „our stateform is still a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy”; c .f . Béla Zsedényi, A magyar alkotmányjog fejlődése 1918-től 
1938-ig [The Developement of Hungarian Constitutional Law from 1918 to 1938] (Miskolc: Ludvig, 1939), p . 3 . In his booklet A kormányformák értelme és 
tartalma [The Meaning and Content of Stateforms] (Budapest, Pfeifer, 1928), Rezső Ruzsnák, on the other hand, does not mention whether Hungary has 
(any) stateform – even though he analyzes the Hungarian constitution as well .
48 Adolf Merkl, „A mai Magyarország államformájának kérdéséhez” [On the Issue of the Stateform of Today’s Hungary], Jogtudományi Közlöny, Vol . 60, 
Issue 1925/1 (33–35 .), p . 34 . Furthermore, Merkl argued that the issue of stateform is connected with the issue of state succession as well: „Thus, with 
the change in stateform state identity has also ceased to exist legally on Hungarian soil three times since 1918 . Monarchy was followed by three differ-
ent republics: democratic republic, Bolshevist republic and the current aristocratic republic with royalist features”; cf . ibid .
49 Péter Kende, „A respublika a magyar történeti tudatban” [Respublica in the Hungarian Historical Consciousness], in Még egyszer a párizsi toronyból [Once 
Again from the Paris Tower]	(Budapest:	Új	Mandátum	Könyvkiadó,	2003),	p.	217.
50 Béla Zsedényi, A vacuum iuris [Vacuum Iuris] (Miskolc: Magyar Jövő, Miskolci Jogászélet Könyvtára, 1928), p . 34 and A magyar alkotmányjog fejlődése 1918-
tól 1938-ig [The Developement of Hungarian Constitutional Law between 1918 and 1938] (Miskolc: Miskolci Jogászélet Könyvtára, 1939) . See also József 
Ruszoly, Három borsodi örökhagyó [Three Testators from Borsod] (Miskolc: Felsőmagyarországi Kiadó, 1992), pp . 117–171 and István Stipta, „Zsedényi Béla 
alkotmányjogi nézetei” [The Views of Béla Zsedényi on Constitutional Law], in Tanıılmányok Zsedéııyi Béla születésének 100. évfordulója tiszteletére [Studies 
in Honour of the Anniversary of Béla Zsedényi’s 100th Birthday], ed . Tamás Csíki (Miskolc: Hermann Ottó Múzeum, 1995), pp . 17–23 .
with no temporal limitations” . Accordingly, „the facts that 
Hungary in this period had no royal courts, Hungarian royal 
railways and [royal] mail cannot be considered to provide con-
clusive proof against the substantial circumstance that the posi-
tion of the king was occupied by an elected head of state from 
an ordinary background .” 49
Some attempted to find a solution that mediates between 
and brides these two views . The use of the above -mentioned 
distinctions quasi this / quasi that and de jure this / de facto that 
also imply this ambition . Béla Zsedényi, the later ill -fated pro-
fessor of law from Miskolc, found a more ingenious solution to 
the problem arguing – by way of a kind of auxiliary theory – 
that the revolutions created a legal vacuum, vacuum iuris . This 
vacuum iuris – in my view (although Zsedényi would perhaps not 
agree with me) – can be regarded as a legal gap in public law and 
lasts until the strongest powers of the new order, practically in 
an illegitimate way, establish a new law that would constitute 
the basis of the new legal system .50 This argument – recalling 
the theories of Georg Jellinek and Bódog Somló – emphasizes 
that there are situations where the drafting of the constitution 
as well as the constitutional legislation create new legality . How-
ever, Zsedényi did not express the view – which I myself am 
tending towards – that this could mean the legality of a new 
state – re -established in the wake of wartime and revolutionary 
collapse . In order for it to mean the legality of a new state, this 
new state authority needs to be legitimate as well – in line with 
its historical tendency, thus in the long term – since in this re-
gard only legitimity can establish legality .
3. Concluding Suggestion
In my view, the category of monarchy without a king as a de-
nomination of stateform can be used – even in an official con-
text – until we decide whether the state authority of the period 
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in question was legitimate or not . There is no wide consensus 
in this question for the time being 51 . This cathegory needs to 
be understood as „monarchy with a governor in the position 
of the king” instead of „monarchy with a governor (regent) 
as head” . Monarchy without a king interpreted this way is 
indeed a unique phenomenon; something that had come to 
the mind of no other people before . In the sense described 
above, this special stateform has only developed and become 
accepted in Hungary (1920–1944) and Spain (1947–1975) . 
In this regard, I share the view of Gyula Gábor (1868–1936), 
today partly forgotten lawyer, military judge and legal histo-
rian . Gábor argued that „the anomalous public legal situation 
regarding the issue of head of state that characterizes Hungary 
today [viz in 1932] does not have a precedent in the history of 
either our own country or anywhere else in the world .” 52 By 
employing the term „monarchy without a king” as stateform 
we naturally recognize the fact that Hungarians were unable – 
and perhaps unwilling – to elect a king for two and a half de-
cades . As a matter of fact, this is the unclear ambivalence – or 
to put it differently: the struggling between principles as firm 
as granite and wallowing pragmatism 53 – that I explained else-
where .54
51 For a comprehensive evaluation of the Horthy era from the recent academic literature see Dávid Turbucz, Horthy Miklós (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 
2011); Levente Püski, „Demokrácia és diktatúra között . A Horthy -rendszer jellegéről” [Between Democracy and Dictatorship . On the Nature of the 
Horthy Era], in Mítoszok, legendák, tévhitek a XX. szazadi magyar törtenelemről [Myths, Legends and Misconceptions about Hungary’s 20th Century History], ed . 
Ignác Romsics (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2002), pp . 206–233; Krisztián Ungváry, A Horthy -rendszer mérlege. Diszkrimináció, szociálpolitika és antiszemitizmus 
Magyarországon [The Balance Sheet of the Horthy -System. Discrimination, Social Policy and Antisemitism in Hungary] (Pécs: Jelenkor, 2012); Ferenc Zetényi 
Csukás, Horthy (Budapest: HK Hermanos Kiadó, 2014); István Nemeskürty, Búcsúpillantás . A Magyar Királyság és kormányzója 1920–1944 [Farewell 
Glance. The Kingdom of Hungary and its Regent 1920–1944] (Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 2014); Catherine Horel, Horthy (Budapest, 2017) and 
Ignác Romsics, A Horthy -korszak [The Horthy Era] (Budapest: Helikon Kiadó, 2017) .
52 Gyula Gábor, op. cit. (1932), p . 185 .
53 In one of the „stories of his grandfather”, László András Magyar illustrates in a concrete context very well what I mean by „wallowing pragmatism”, 
see László András Magyar, „Nagyapám történeteiből . Hogyan lett Horthy Miklós Magyarország kormányzója?” [From the Stories of My Grandfather . 
How did Miklós Horthy become Regent of Hungary?], Holmi, Vol . 24, Issue 2012/1, pp . 72–73 .
54 See Peter Takács, A rózsa neve: Magyar Köztársaság. Az államok nevéről és a magyar állam átnevezéséről. [The Name of the Rose: Hungarian Republic. On Names 
of States and on Renaming Hangarian State (in 2011)] (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 2015) pp . 121–122 .
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